Confirmed breach. Intrusion Apr 27, 2023–May 13, 2023, discovered May 13, 2023 — the first regulatory filing landed 229 days later (flagged late). 543,545 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksVermont✗ VT AG >45 bdayHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
543,545
Data types
2
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
FL VT
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Apr 27, 2023 → May 13, 2023
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Electrostim Medical Services, Inc. d/b/A EMSI (FL) reported to HHS OCR on 2023-12-28 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 542,990 individuals. Breached information was located on a Network Server. No business associate was present. No further detail was provided in the web description.
Affected (this filing): 542,990
HHS notified
🍁Vermont State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Electrostim Medical Services, Inc. (EMSI) notified consumers of a data breach where an unknown actor accessed the network between April 27 and May 13, 2023. The incident exposed patient names, contact info, diagnoses, insurance details, and prescribed products. EMSI engaged forensic specialists, notified law enforcement and regulators, and is enhancing security. 555 Rhode Island residents were identified as affected.
Affected (this filing): 555
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.