Confirmed breach. Intrusion Sep 13, 2024–Oct 6, 2024, discovered Sep 13, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 203 days later (flagged late). 130 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksVermont✗ VT AG >45 bdayFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedlow sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
130
Data types
2
Credentials · PII
Jurisdictions
2
IN VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Sep 13, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Sep 13, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
203 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
The Network Advocating Against Domestic Violence reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-09-13 and was reported on 2025-04-04. 6 Indiana residents were affected. 130 individuals affected in total.
The Network: Advocating Against Domestic Violence notified consumers of a security incident involving unauthorized access to a single employee email account from September 13, 2024, to October 6, 2024. The breach likely resulted from phishing, leading to credential compromise. Personal information, including email addresses, was accessed. The organization disabled the account, reset credentials, engaged third-party specialists, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring.
VT AG >45 bday
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.