Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed May 29, 2024. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_621e20e658fa47a8 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Financial account · Credentials
ME NH
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
May 11, 2023
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 24, 2024
Reported by MAINE AG filing
Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C. notified approximately 3 New Hampshire residents and 3 Rhode Island residents of a data security event involving unauthorized access via stolen credentials. The firm notified federal law enforcement, implemented technical security measures, and provided complimentary credit monitoring through Experian IdentityWorks.
Affected (this filing): 3
Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C. reported a data breach to the Maine Attorney General, stating that an external system breach (hacking) occurred on May 11, 2023. The breach was discovered on April 24, 2024. The personal information of 5 Maine residents was affected, including names and financial account numbers or credit/debit card numbers with their corresponding security codes or PINs. The company began notifying affected individuals on May 29, 2024, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring and identity theft protection services through Experian.
Affected (this filing): 5
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.