Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Jun 19, 2025 → Jul 3, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_611814a51ed44753 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 95%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Government ID · PHI · PII
IN TX
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 21, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Oct 23, 2024
Reported by TEXAS AG filing
City of Coppell reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-10-21 and was reported on 2025-06-19. 5 Indiana residents were affected. 19,640 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 19,640
City of Coppell based in Coppell, Texas, a governmental entity entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2024-10-23 and reported on 2025-07-03. 16,835 Texas residents were affected. 19,640 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Social Security Number Information;Driver’s License number;Government-issued ID number (e.g. passport, state ID card);Financial Information (e.g. account number, credit or debit card number);Medical Information;Health Insurance Information;Date of Birth. Consumers were notified via Posted at company website or special website;U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 16,835
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.