Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 6, 2024–Nov 3, 2025, discovered Nov 3, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 49 days later. 6,494 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedCalifornia✓ CA 60-day OK · 49dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
6,494
Data types
2
PII · PHI
Jurisdictions
2
CA CT
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 6, 2024 → Nov 3, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
362 days
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Nov 3, 2025
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
49 days
🇺🇸CTHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
TapestryHealth reported to HHS on 2025-12-22 a Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 6,494 individuals. Breached information located on Other. The breach involved demographic, clinical, and financial PHI. TapestryHealth terminated the contracted employee and implemented additional safeguards.
Affected (this filing):
🐻California State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
TapestryHealth disclosed that a contracted employee engaged in unauthorized job-sharing, allowing an unidentified individual to access patient personal and medical information between November 6, 2024, and November 3, 2025. The incident was discovered on November 3, 2025. Affected data included names, facility information, and medical records (diagnoses, treatments, medications). The employee was terminated, and access limitations were implemented. Credit monitoring was offered to affected individuals.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.