Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
11,403
Data types
3
Health (basic) · Identity (basic) · Financial account
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 4, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
437 days
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
La Clinica de La Raza, Inc. filed a breach notification with the California AG regarding an incident dated November 4, 2024, involving TriZetto (a third-party vendor). The attachment PDF was not extractable. Data types likely include patient PII/PHI based on the breach letter title referencing 'Patient Breach Letter'. Limited detail available from source.
🐻CALIFORNIAHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
La Clinica de La Raza, Inc. reported to HHS on 2026-01-22 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 11,403 individuals. A subcontractor of the covered entity's business associate experienced a hacking attack that compromised PHI including clinical, demographic, and financial information. Breached information was located on a Network Server. The CE, subcontractor, and media were all notified; OCR provided technical assistance regarding the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule.
Affected (this filing): 11,403
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.