Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Feb 14, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_4a3edf82cc5148b2 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
IN VT WV
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 2, 2024 → Oct 3, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Oct 2, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
Charleston Area Medical Center notified Vermont AG of a phishing incident discovered Oct 2, 2024. An unauthorized party accessed a single user's email mailbox between Oct 2-3, 2024. Impacted data included names, DOB, driver's license, health info, and insurance info. CAMC engaged forensic experts, provided phishing training, enhanced safeguards, and offered 24 months of identity theft protection.
Charleston Area Medical Center (WV) reported to HHS on 2025-02-14 a Hacking/IT Incident (email phishing) affecting 67,413 individuals. An employee was the subject of a phishing attack that compromised PHI stored in Email systems. Exposed data included names, Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, birthdates, addresses, diagnoses, lab results, medications, and other treatment information. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media, and responded with additional administrative and technical safeguards and employee retraining.
Affected (this filing): 67,413
Charleston Area Medical Center reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-10-02 and was reported on 2025-02-14. 35 Indiana residents were affected. 67,413 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 67,413
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.