Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Jul 1, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_45197727317e4872 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
MT VA WA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 2, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 6, 2024
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
Radiology Associates of Richmond reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2025-07-01. The breach occurred from 04/02/2024 to 04/06/2024. 80 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 80
Radiology Associates of Richmond, Inc. (VA) reported to HHS OCR on 2025-07-01 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 1,419,091 individuals. Breached information was located on a Network Server. No business associate was identified as present. No further detail was available in the web description.
Affected (this filing): 1,419,091
Radiology Associates of Richmond Inc, a health sector entity reported a ransomware incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2024-04-06 and filed notice on 2025-07-01. 570 Washington residents were affected. 451 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 4 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 570
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.