Hicks Thomas LLP reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-11-20 and was reported on 2025-09-10. 515 Indiana residents were affected. 978 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 978
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Sep 10, 2025 → Sep 12, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_39697ca4582649fc · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Financial account
IN VT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 20, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Nov 29, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
Hicks Thomas LLP reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-11-20 and was reported on 2025-09-10. 515 Indiana residents were affected. 978 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 978
Hicks Thomas, LLP, a law firm, disclosed a ransomware incident occurring between November 20-30, 2024. The breach potentially exposed personal information including SSNs, driver's licenses, financial account numbers, and medical/health insurance information. The firm engaged a cybersecurity firm for investigation and provided 12 months of complimentary TransUnion credit monitoring and fraud assistance to affected individuals.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.