Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,055,489
Data types
4
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
FL NH
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Aug 1, 2011 → Aug 31, 2011
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
66 days
⛰️New Hampshire State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
State of New Hampshire Attorney General's office filed a breach notification regarding Nemours Foundation on 2011-10-06. The provided document source contains only structural HTML markup and no readable incident details, preventing extraction of specific breach mechanics, dates, or affected data types.
🇺🇸FLHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
The Nemours Foundation reported to HHS on 2011-10-07 a Loss affecting 1,055,489 individuals. Breached information located on Other (backup tapes). A locked cabinet containing unencrypted backup tapes with patient ePHI (names, addresses, SSNs, diagnoses) was removed during a facility remodeling in August 2011. The tapes were not recovered. The entity offered credit monitoring and implemented encryption, MFA, and physical security improvements.
Affected (this filing): 1,055,489
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.