Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Feb 13, 2026 → Feb 17, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_33dba018cf7049b7 · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
IN TX
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Feb 28, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jan 12, 2026
Reported by TEXAS AG filing
City of Mission reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-02-28 and was reported on 2026-02-13. 3 Indiana residents were affected. 12,443 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 12,443
City of Mission based in Mission, Texas, a governmental entity entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2026-01-12 and reported on 2026-02-17. 8,190 Texas residents were affected. 12,443 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Address;Social Security Number Information;Driver’s License number;Government-issued ID number (e.g. passport, state ID card);Financial Information (e.g. account number, credit or debit card number);Medical Information;Health Insurance Information;Date of Birth. Consumers were notified via Posted at company website or special website;U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 8,190
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.