Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window May 1, 2026 → May 6, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_300ffb91e0e84c13 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
PII · Identity (basic)
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
MA NH
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jul 30, 2024 → Aug 2, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Aug 2, 2024
Reported by MASSACHUSETTS AG, NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filings
St. James Place of Baton Rouge, a healthcare provider, disclosed a data privacy incident where unauthorized actors accessed network systems between July 30 and August 2, 2024. The breach exposed personal information of individuals, including names and other identifiers. The company secured its systems, retained forensic specialists, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring via Kroll. No fraud was reported.
St. James Place of Baton Rouge, a Louisiana retirement community, notified the New Hampshire Attorney General of a data breach affecting one NH resident. Unauthorized network activity occurred July 30–August 2, 2024, discovered August 2, 2024. The incident involved unauthorized access to personal information, including names and Social Security numbers. The organization retained forensic specialists, secured its network, and offered credit monitoring services. Notice to the single affected resident was issued May 5, 2026.
Affected (this filing): 1
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.