Cash Aisle (Niibin, LLC) reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-10-05. The breach occurred from 7/2/2020 to 9/15/2020. 3 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 3
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Oct 5, 2020 → Oct 30, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_2dce7b764b084e6d · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
ME MT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jul 2, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Sep 15, 2020
Reported by MAINE AG filing
Cash Aisle (Niibin, LLC) reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-10-05. The breach occurred from 7/2/2020 to 9/15/2020. 3 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 3
Niibin, LLC, doing business as Cash Aisle, reported a data breach affecting 1,191 individuals. The breach, which occurred on July 2, 2020, and was discovered on September 15, 2020, resulted from an external system breach (hacking). The compromised information included names in combination with financial account numbers and their associated security codes or PINs. The company began notifying affected individuals on October 5, 2020, and offered 24 months of credit and identity monitoring services.
Affected (this filing): 1,191
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.