Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 12, 2024–Nov 13, 2024, discovered Nov 13, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 168 days later (flagged late). 8,759 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 168dLeak gap⏱ Leak >90dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedlow sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
8,759
Data types
1
Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
CA IN
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 12, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Nov 13, 2024
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
168 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Conrey Insurance Brokers & Risk Managers reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-11-12 and was reported on 2025-04-30. 8 Indiana residents were affected. 8,759 individuals affected in total.
Conrey Insurance Brokers & Risk Managers notified the California Attorney General of an unauthorized access incident. The breach occurred between November 12 and November 13, 2024, and was discovered on November 13, 2024. The company identified unusual activity and investigated, determining that unauthorized access occurred. Affected data includes names and potentially other personal information. The company notified law enforcement, changed network passwords, reviewed policies, and offered complimentary credit monitoring and identity protection services to affected individuals. The investigation and data review were completed on April 10, 2025.
CA 60-day late · 168d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.