Clustered 3 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Jul 13, 2021. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_25393b64eb10407e · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
MT WA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Dec 1, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 26, 2021
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
King County Public Hospital District No. 2, dba EvergreenHealth reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-07-13. The breach occurred from 12/1/2020 to 12/31/2020. 48 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 48
King County Public Hospital District No. 2 d/b/a EvergreenHealth reported to HHS on 2021-07-13 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 22,579 individuals. The covered entity's business associate experienced a cyber-attack that affected ePHI including names, dates of birth, health insurance and financial information, and treatment information. Breached information was located on a Network Server. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media.
Affected (this filing): 22,579
King County Public Health Hospital District No. 2 Dba Evergreen Health, a health sector entity reported a malware incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2021-04-26 and filed notice on 2021-07-13. 20,215 Washington residents were affected. 78 days elapsed between awareness and notification.
Affected (this filing): 20,215
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.