Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed May 15, 2018. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_1fe93290a75148e1 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
CA MD
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Sep 27, 2016 → Mar 18, 2018
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Mar 1, 2018
Reported by HHS OCR filing
Mar 18, 2018
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
California AG submission for LifeBridge Health regarding a data breach occurring between September 27, 2016, and March 18, 2018. The filing is a sample notification; specific data types, affected individual counts, and attack vectors are not detailed in the provided HTML source.
LifeBridge Health, Inc. (MD) reported to HHS OCR on 2018-05-15 a Hacking/IT Incident (malware attack on a network server hosting electronic medical records) affecting 538,127 individuals. An unauthorized person accessed the server on September 27, 2016; the breach was not discovered until March 2018. PHI involved included demographic and clinical information. OCR reviewed compliance with Privacy and Security Rules and obtained assurances of corrective actions, including increased password controls and contingency/disaster-recovery procedures.
Affected (this filing): 538,127
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.