Confirmed breach. Intrusion Dec 6, 2024, discovered Dec 7, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 151 days later (flagged late). 5,827 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 151dLeak gap⏱ Leak >90dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedlow sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
5,827
Data types
2
PII · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
CA IN
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Dec 6, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Dec 7, 2024
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
151 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Long Beach Convention and Entertainment Center reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-12-06 and was reported on 2025-05-07. 2 Indiana residents were affected. 5,827 individuals affected in total.
Long Beach Convention and Entertainment Center notified the California AG of a cybersecurity incident. On Dec 7, 2024, the Center identified suspicious activity and took systems offline. An investigation determined that certain files containing personal information were taken. Affected individuals include visitors, employees, and dependents. The Center is offering 24 months of complimentary Experian IdentityWorks credit monitoring.
CA 60-day late · 151d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.