Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Nov 6, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_19da15d85c0a4706 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
PII · PHI · Identity (basic)
CA FL MT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Mar 1, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Sep 11, 2020
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Bruce L. Boros, M.D., P.A. DBA Advanced Urgent Care reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-11-06. The breach occurred on 3/1/2020. 37 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 37
Bruce L. Boros, M.D., P.A. DBA Advanced Urgent Care reported a ransomware incident on March 1, 2020, where files on a backup drive were encrypted. The breach was discovered on September 11, 2020, during a forensic investigation. The incident involved personal and protected health information (PHI). No evidence of misuse was found. The organization engaged external cybersecurity professionals, offered one year of Equifax credit monitoring, and implemented additional technical safeguards and workforce training.
Bruce L. Boros, M.D., P.A. DBA Advanced Urgent Care reported to HHS on 2020-11-06 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 58,823 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The incident involved a ransomware attack on electronic protected health information (ePHI), including names, dates of birth, addresses, clinical/treatment info, and Social Security numbers. The entity notified HHS, individuals, and media, and implemented additional safeguards and workforce retraining.
Affected (this filing): 58,823
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.