Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 7, 2024, discovered May 8, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 26 days later. 2,269 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksTexas✓ TX AG ≤30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
2,269
Data types
3
Government ID · PHI · PII
Jurisdictions
2
IN TX
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 7, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dickinson Bradshaw Fowler & Hagen PC reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-11-07 and was reported on 2025-06-03. 10 Indiana residents were affected. 2,269 individuals affected in total.
Dickinson, Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen, P.C. based in Des Moines, Iowa, a other entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2025-05-08 and reported on 2025-06-05. 1,433 Texas residents were affected. 2,269 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Address;Social Security Number Information;Driver’s License number;Government-issued ID number (e.g. passport, state ID card);Financial Information (e.g. account number, credit or debit card number);Medical Information;Health Insurance Information. Consumers were notified via U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 1,433
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.