Emergency Responders Health Center reported to HHS on 2025-09-26 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 1528 individuals. Breached information located on Email.
Affected (this filing): 1,528
Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Sep 26, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_190e8e56756f46df · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
ID MT WA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 11, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 11, 2025
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
Emergency Responders Health Center reported to HHS on 2025-09-26 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 1528 individuals. Breached information located on Email.
Affected (this filing): 1,528
Emergency Responders Health Center, a health sector entity reported a phishing incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2025-04-11 and filed notice on 2025-09-26. 526 Washington residents were affected. 168 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 121 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 526
Emergency Responders Health Center reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2025-09-26. The breach occurred on 04/11/2025. 3 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 3
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.