Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jun 15, 2012–Oct 1, 2012, discovered Jun 15, 2012 — the first regulatory filing landed 166 days later. 12,360 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
12,360
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
CA FL
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jun 15, 2012 → Oct 1, 2012
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Jun 15, 2012
Reported by HHS OCR filing
166 days
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Advanced Data Processing, Inc. reported a data breach to the California Attorney General. The unauthorized access occurred between June 15, 2012, and October 1, 2012. The filing provides only the occurrence window; no discovery date, affected count, data types, or incident details are disclosed in the available metadata or attachments.
🇺🇸FLHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Advanced Data Processing, Inc. (dba Intermedix) reported to HHS on 2012-11-29 a Theft affecting 12,360 individuals. Breached information located on Desktop Computer. An employee inappropriately accessed and sold patient PHI (names, SSNs, addresses, DOB, claims) to third parties. The CE engaged third-party reviewers, implemented DLP and log management solutions, improved employee training, and launched a vendor management program.
Affected (this filing): 12,360
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.