Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 23, 2024, discovered May 16, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 19 days later. 4,215 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksVermont✓ VT AG ≤14 bdayFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
4,215
Data types
3
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Financial account
Jurisdictions
2
IN VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Mar 23, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
54 days
Breach discovered
May 16, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Corcoran Ender and Associates LLC reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-03-23 and was reported on 2024-06-04. 94 Indiana residents were affected. 4,215 individuals affected in total.
Corcoran Ender And Associates LLC notified consumers of a data breach involving unauthorized access to its network. The incident resulted in the exposure of names, Social Security numbers, and financial account numbers for direct deposit. Fraudulent tax returns were filed using this data. The company reported the incident to the IRS and state authorities and is offering one year of complimentary identity monitoring services to affected individuals.
VT AG ≤14 bday
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.