Disclosures Claims Reports Entities Incidents Pulse

Feed live

DisclosureLens

Structured extracts of public breach disclosures — regulator filings (SEC, HHS, state AGs, EU DPAs) alongside threat-actor leak-site claims and press reports. SEC and HHS filings render inline from the originating regulator’s public record under the fair report privilege; other sources link out to the source URL. AI-extracted with full per-record audit trail (model, prompt version, confidence).

ai_assisted: true · Article 50 disclosure on every record

Product

Disclosures feed
Pulse · analytics
Entities
Breach notifications by state

Methodology

How extraction works
Confidence & review
About the bot

Trust

Security
Self-disclosure commitment
API documentation
API keys

v0.1.0 · coverage growing weekly

Community Health Plan of Washington data breach (2016) · DisclosureLens

All incidents View linkage analytics →

Merged incident · 3 filings

Community Health Plan of Washington

Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Dec 21, 2016 → Jan 3, 2017. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →

⚠ 1 cross-filing discrepancy →Merge100%

Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 7, 2016, discovered Nov 3, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 48 days later. 354,781 individuals reported across the linked filings.

incident inc_11399e02a5f64df6 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%

Litigation Timing

Notification delay

48days

Discovered → first regulatory filing

Discovery variance

27days

Range of discovered_at dates across filings

Filing span

Regulatory clocksWashington✓ WA AG ≤30dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline

HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity

Affected (total reported)

13days

Time between earliest and latest filing

Not recorded for this incident

Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.

354,781

Data types

Health (basic) · Identity (basic)

Jurisdictions

FEDERAL MT WA

Linked filings

HHS OCR · State AG

Timeline

Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline

Breach discovered
Nov 3, 2016
Reported by HHS OCR filing
Breach window
Nov 7, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredconflicts with Nov 3, 2016AG web form
Nov 30, 2016
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
🌲Washington State AGFirst filing
Filed Dec 21, 2016bd_0a35fce30888272b
Community Health Plan of Washington, a health sector entity reported a unauthorized access incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2016-11-30 and filed notice on 2016-12-21. 353,388 Washington residents were affected. 21 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 319 days to identify the breach.
Affected (this filing): 353,388
WA AG ≤30d
🦬Montana State AG
Filed Dec 29, 2016bd_8eedda41b0dc7189
Community Health Plan of Washington reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-12-29. The breach occurred on 11/7/2016. 18 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 18
FEDERALHHS OCRMost recent
Filed Jan 3, 2017bd_e74e7ea642691fa1
Community Health Plan of Washington reported to HHS on 2017-01-03 a ransomware incident at a business associate, Summit Reinsurance, affecting 1,375 individuals. The breach, discovered on November 3, 2016, occurred on a network server and compromised protected health information including names, addresses, dates of birth, provider names, and health insurance claim information.
Affected (this filing): 1,375
HHS notified

About this clustering

DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.