Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Jul 21, 2023. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_0b3850e367274a53 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Identity (basic) · Financial account · Financial credentials
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
CA VT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 24, 2021 → Dec 14, 2022
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
May 3, 2023
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
Jun 6, 2023
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Creedmoor Sports, Inc. notified customers that an unauthorized party accessed CommerceV3, Inc.'s systems between Nov 24, 2021 and Dec 14, 2022. CommerceV3 informed Creedmoor on June 6, 2023, that cardholder data (name, email, billing address, payment card number, CVV, expiration date) was potentially accessed. Creedmoor offered 24 months of credit monitoring and fraud assistance.
Creedmoor Sports, Inc. notified consumers that its third-party e-commerce provider, CommerceV3, Inc., experienced a data security incident. An unauthorized party accessed CommerceV3's systems between November 24, 2021, and December 14, 2022. The breach potentially exposed customer names, email addresses, billing addresses, payment card numbers, CVV codes, and expiration dates. Creedmoor engaged forensic experts and is offering 12 months of free credit monitoring and fraud assistance to affected individuals.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.