Confirmed breach. Intrusion Dec 13, 2013, discovered Dec 13, 2013 — the first regulatory filing landed 52 days later (flagged late). 2,269 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✗ HIPAA 60-day late · 63dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
2,269
Data types
2
Identity (basic) · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Dec 13, 2013
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Dec 13, 2013
Reported by HHS OCR filing
52 days
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
UC Davis Health System notified patients that a medical provider's email account was compromised via a phishing scam on December 13, 2013. Affected data included names, medical record numbers, and clinic visit dates. No financial information or SSNs were involved. The organization deleted the phishing email, blocked the website, and warned staff.
🐻CALIFORNIAHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
UC Davis Medical Center reported to HHS on 2014-02-14 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 2269 individuals. Breached information located on Email. A fraudulent phishing email instructed employees to input authentication credentials on a fake site, impacting three accounts containing ePHI of 2,269 individuals.
Affected (this filing): 2,269
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.