Confirmed breach. Intrusion Dec 12, 2019, discovered Aug 25, 2020 — the first regulatory filing landed 59 days later. 51,860 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaine⏱ ME AG >30d · 61dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
51,860
Data types
2
Government ID · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
ME TN
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Dec 12, 2019
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
257 days
Breach discovered
Aug 25, 2020
Reported by MAINE AG filing
59 days
🇺🇸TNHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Centerstone of Tennessee, Inc. reported to HHS on 2020-10-23 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 50,965 individuals. Breached information located on Email. Employees were victims of an email phishing attack exposing ePHI including names, addresses, DOB, driver's license numbers, SSNs, diagnoses, lab results, and medications.
Centerstone of Tennessee, Inc. reported an external system breach (hacking) occurring on 12/12/2019, discovered on 08/25/2020. The incident compromised names and Social Security Numbers of 51,860 individuals. Centerstone notified affected individuals in writing on 10/22/2020 and provided 12 months of credit monitoring and identity theft recovery services through IDX.
Affected (this filing): 51,860
ME AG >30d · 61d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.