Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jan 16, 2024–Feb 4, 2024, discovered Feb 1, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 57 days later. 3,287 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
3,287
Data types
4
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
AZ NH
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jan 16, 2024 → Feb 4, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Feb 1, 2024
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
57 days
⛰️New Hampshire State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Rehabilitation Hospital of Northern Arizona notified the NH Attorney General of a breach occurring Jan 16–Feb 4, 2024, discovered Feb 1, 2024. Unauthorized access to IT systems resulted in patient PII (names + SSN/DOB/ID) exposure. Notifications mailed March 29, 2024, offering 1-year credit monitoring. Systems isolated; forensic investigation ongoing.
Rehabilitation Hospital of Northern Arizona reported to HHS on 2024-03-29 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 3287 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The incident involved ransomware encrypting PHI including names, DOB, SSN, driver's license, and treatment data. The entity offered credit monitoring and implemented security safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 3,287
HHS notified
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.