PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
ent_019e5b620f98ab0bd7000912afa3ac78
Disclosures
5
State AG · 3 jurisdictions
Incidents
1
filings grouped by incident
Max affected reported
583
as filed · State AG WA
Leak-site claims
0
none in sample
Identity resolution
- Canonical name
- PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
- Normalized
- principal financial— dedupe via name-norm; Microsoft / MSFT collapse to one row
- GLEIF LEI
- GM6ECX91HA2YJ1NHHN48
- SEC EDGAR CIK
- None — not an SEC registrant
- Domain
- None on record
Disclosure history (5)newest first
- 🦬Montana State AGas victim2023-06-09
Principal Financial Group reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2023-06-09. The breach occurred on 5/12/2023. 1 Montana residents were affected.
- 🌲Washington State AGas victim2020-05-07
Principal Financial Services, Inc., a finance sector entity reported a theft or mistake incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2020-01-06 and filed notice on 2020-05-07. 583 Washington residents were affected. 122 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 44 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
- 🦬Montana State AGas victim2020-04-28
Principal Financial Group reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-04-28. The breach occurred from 11/23/2019 to 1/6/2020. 86 Montana residents were affected.
- ⛰️New Hampshire State AGas victim2017-03-20
New Hampshire Attorney General's office received a notification from Principal Financial Group regarding a cybersecurity incident on March 20, 2017. The provided source document contains only page markers and no substantive breach details, preventing extraction of specific incident details, affected counts, or data types.
- ⛰️New Hampshire State AGas victim2010-05-14
Principal Financial Group notified the New Hampshire Attorney General on May 14, 2010, regarding a security breach involving the compromise of employer credentials. The incident involved unauthorized access via valid accounts, leading to the reset of employer group credentials and the implementation of an Employer Access Code for authentication. The breach affected customer data.