Concord Components
bd_f8f9708f5ae50d36 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Concord Components →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
We obtained about 17gb of data of the following companies: JConcord Components, Inc. was founded in 1995 in Concord, Nebrask a as a retail catalog company, supplying hard-to-find electronic components. Wefapress is a leading manufacturer of plastic products, speciali zing in high-quality semi-finished products, custom plastic parts , and various profiles and guides. At Environment Masters, the company prides ourselves on deliverin g honest, reliable service. If the company tell you, you'll be be tter off with Crystal Springs HVAC repair, you can believe what t he company say. Fairmont Hot Springs Resort, home to Canada's largest natural min eral hot springs, is a year-round destination nestled in the hear t of the British Columbia Rocky Mountains and the stunning Columb ia Valley. Road America, located in Elkhart Lake, Wisconsin, is one of the w orld's fastest permanent road racing tracks, offering a variety o f motorsport events and experiences. The company provides a range of services including driving schools, karting, and various raci ng events such as the MotoAmerica Superbikes and the INDYCAR Gran d Prix. You will find personal employee personal data (hundreds of SSNs a nd so on), medical information, client information, numerous proj ect files, confidential files, accounting and financials and othe r internal operational files.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Mar 24, 2026
Claim posted
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No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs