Clinical Registry Solutions
bd_f828cc6ad7ec7ecc · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Clinical Registry Solutions →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Clinical Registry Solutions (CRS) is a healthcare data management company based in New York, Un ited States, formerly operating as Cardiac Registry Support. The company specializes in clinica l data abstraction, medical record abstraction, and registry support services for hospitals, he alth systems, contract research organizations, and clinical staffing firms across the United St ates and Canada. We will upload 41gb of corporate data soon. Detailed employee personal information (passports, DLs, SSNs, health information, and other docs), client documents and personal information, fina ncials, payment details, contracts and agreements, NDAs, and so on.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
May 6, 2026
Claim posted
—
Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_401d01df51fe3e5f2026-04-09 · +27dVerified by operator
Regulatory filings (8) · sorted by filing gap
- California State AGbd_cf661af5a4e58e572026-06-11 · +36dVerified
- New Hampshire State AGbd_f331216109245cf42026-06-11 · +36dVerified
- HHS OCRbd_fe5df6567cc5082d2026-06-12 · +37dVerified
- Nebraska State AGbd_3dde56a6b54fc5f22026-06-17 · +42dVerified by operator
Show 4 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 84d gap
- Indiana State AGbd_8e3980e02c3b30f22026-06-17 · +42dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_769d7856f7ce42202026-06-25 · +50dVerified by operator
- California State AGbd_84ea03610972f25d2026-07-29 · +84dVerified by operator
- California State AGbd_b568d923923502902026-07-29 · +84dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 9 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing May 6, last Jul 29 (CA) — a 84-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs