INP Schweiz
bd_f465587c6d6182b2 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for INP Schweiz →Press / market disclosure — not a breach-notification filing
A media or market posting that confirms an incident but carries no breach-notification fields, so compliance clocks aren't assessable. The summary below is extracted from the coverage and machine-translated to English — verify against the source.
Summary
machine-translatedCyberattack on INP Switzerland. INP Switzerland AG: On the night of February 25 to 26, 2026, the company INP Switzerland was the victim of a cyberattack that led to the preventive shutdown of its systems. Although data was stolen, the company confirmed that sensitive information was not compromised and that operations were fully restored two days later. Akira claimed responsibility for the attack on March 20. Linked ransomware group: akira.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Feb 25, 2026
Press report
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Attack → press
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_3441ab377045ff832026-02-25Candidate
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- incident type + narrative only (may be machine-translated)
- discovery date
- materiality
- affected count
- data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs