Egyptian Electric Cooperative Association
bd_f2420910a0a3ae38 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Egyptian Electric Cooperative Association →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Egyptian Electric Cooperative, currently headquartered in Murphysboro, Illinois, is a consumer-owned corporation that supplies electric power to members in portions of Jackson, Randolph, Perry, Williamson, and parts of St. Clair, Johnson, Union, Monroe, Franklin and Washington counties in southern Illinois. More than 15,000 households and businesses receive power from Egyptian Electric Cooperative. We are a distribution utility, meaning we do not generate our own electricity. We purchase our power from Southern Illinois Power Cooperative (SIPC) which is located south of Marion, Illinois, at Lake of Egypt. SIPC is a generating and transmission cooperative which is owned and controlled by the southern most rural electric cooperatives in the most southern region of Illinois, and that receive electricity from SIPC. Egyptian Electric is wholly owned by the people it serves, and is governed by nine board of directors, elected by members. Approximately 38 employees work for Egyptian Electric to serve its residential, commercial and industrial accounts. To learn more, and view our by-laws, visit the New Members page. The Cooperative
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Oct 20, 2022
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (1) · sorted by filing gap
- Indiana State AGbd_ddab147bcc0e59d42022-10-19 · +1dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 2 filings
View merged incident ↗Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs