Barr and Barr
bd_e6b082e130b11fd4 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Barr and Barr →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Barr & Barr, Inc is a construction management company that provid es building information modeling & construction management. We are going to upload 323gb of corporate data. Employee detailed information (name, address, DOB, phones, scanned passports, DLs, death reports and so on), financials, clients information, contr acts and agreements, projects, and of other files.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Sep 4, 2025
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_5cf8932058aa8e7c2025-10-01 · +27dVerified by operator
Regulatory filings (5) · sorted by filing gap
- Maine State AGbd_36280e2196be7b822025-12-04 · +91dCandidate
- Massachusetts State AGbd_39bdba1765f762462025-12-04 · +91dVerified by operator
- New Hampshire State AGbd_6a9c6947ecc0a23e2025-12-04 · +91dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_7322a31d2c6538932025-12-04 · +91dVerified
Show 1 more filing ↓Show fewer ↑up to 91d gap
- Vermont State AGbd_88b4177324f68d322025-12-04 · +91dVerified
Filing propagation · 6 filings · 5 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Sep 4, last Dec 4 (VT) — a 91-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs