Yusen Logistics
bd_d101f28b0c292e9a · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Yusen Logistics →Press / market disclosure — not a breach-notification filing
A media or market posting that confirms an incident but carries no breach-notification fields, so compliance clocks aren't assessable. The summary below is extracted from the coverage — verify against the source.
Appliance supplier confirms delays due to cyber-attack - kbbreview. Yusen Logistics: Yusen Logistics, a delivery partner for large kitchen companies such as BSH, Smeg, Haier, and Howdens, has confirmed that its current delays are due to a cybersecurity incident. The company experienced a computer system outage following a malicious attack on Sunday, September 17. Yusen is currently working with third-party forensic experts to restore its systems and conduct a thorough investigation into the nature of the incident. . Linked ransomware group: alphv.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
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Breach window unknown
Sep 17, 2023
Press report
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No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Attack → press
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Sitealphvbd_43436590db369f982023-09-22 · +5dCandidate
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
If an SEC 8-K, state-AG notice or victim statement lands, DisclosureLens merges it into an incident and links it here.
Source ceiling
- incident type + narrative only (may be machine-translated)
- discovery date
- materiality
- affected count
- data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs