Katsky Korins
bd_d0ad3fc693d68e51 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Katsky Korins →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Meow on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Nov 26, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap
- Vermont State AGbd_5a2c1f409bd0cf342024-03-22 · +117dCandidate
- Massachusetts State AGbd_1f0dd8af79c9a83c2024-03-29 · +124dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 3 filings · 2 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Nov 26, last Mar 29 (MA) — a 124-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
meow
According to ransomware.live, Meow emerged in 2022 (resurfacing aggressively in 2024), initially operating as a RaaS using the Conti v2 codebase before transitioning to a data-extortion-only model — selling stolen data rather than encrypting files — with a heavy focus on US healthcare and medical research organizations.