Green Diamond Resource Company
bd_c80d7b45e85dbf89 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Green Diamond Resource Company →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Green Diamond is a fifth-generation, family-owned forest productscompany that owns and manages working forests in nine states throughout the western and southern U.S. Working the forest for so long seems to have taken away the management of this company of their ability to communicate with people. They didn't utter a word for about two weeks after the hack.We found some interesting data on their network and are posting over 30GB of their business information, including personal information, here.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jul 10, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (10) · sorted by filing gap
- HHS OCRbd_53c799f0b10cfd0a2024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- Massachusetts State AGbd_5c434b39c6ae584d2024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- Oregon State AGbd_694f98915dcd2dac2024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- Washington State AGbd_7b23d50bf8814e482024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
Show 6 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 284d gap
- Maine State AGbd_8bce8b6f7748ef422024-04-19 · +284dVerified
- Vermont State AGbd_a39d9bdd6ac5dea62024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- Indiana State AGbd_b17f3b29db9791372024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- New Hampshire State AGbd_c1c51d186d07b1d52024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- California State AGbd_cc743e6bb046ac2f2024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
- Montana State AGbd_d6d44811063c84b82024-04-19 · +284dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 11 filings · 9 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jul 10, last Apr 19 (MT) — a 284-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs