Sunrise
bd_b5f9edc8f94d1b14 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Sunrise →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Sunrise Company is a renowned real estate developer and builder specializing in resort and gol f course communities. Established in 1963, the company has developed over 16,000 homes and con dominiums, along with creating multiple resort hotels and commercial structures. Toscana Country Club is a luxury private equity club and residential community located in Indi an Wells, California, offering an exceptional lifestyle amidst beautiful olive and cypress lan dscapes. Andalusia Country Club is a luxurious community near Palm Springs, offering distinctive golf c ourse homes and a premier country club experience. Here is the access to 13gb of corporate data of the above mentioned entities. Employee persona l information including family of the CEO (passports, DLs, death records and so on), contracts and agreements, detailed financials, clients information, projects, etc. Click the download button. You will find several password-free archives. Click on any of them to start the download.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jun 3, 2026
Claim posted
—
Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_35cba7e2ad8282712026-05-26 · +8dVerified by operator
Regulatory filings (3) · sorted by filing gap
- California State AGbd_a48a8f1361370e5d2026-07-28 · +55dCandidate
- Massachusetts State AGbd_0768f47f9fb82ada2026-07-29 · +56dVerified
- Texas State AGbd_337a568f99e217972026-07-31 · +58dVerified
Filing propagation · 4 filings · 3 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jun 3, last Jul 31 (TX) — a 58-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs