Wakefield Terrace Associates Limited Partnership
bd_b1785cfabb57b09a · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Wakefield Terrace Associates Limited Partnership →5 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Wakefield & Associates is a financial services company that speci alizes in debt collection and billing services. We are ready to upload more than 13 GB of sensitive private corpo rate documents such as: SSNs, passport numbers, confidential lice nses, agreements and contracts, financial data (audits, payment d etails, reports), contact numbers and e-mail addresses of employe es and customers, medical insurance documents, internal correspon dences, medicare numbers, etc.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Nov 30, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (10) · sorted by filing gap
- Vermont State AGbd_456746984ec0efc52025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_5bce45c3a4b108ce2025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- Montana State AGbd_a2a1187ae7ee142e2025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- Nebraska State AGbd_b06cc228ddc02dde2025-11-07 · +708dVerified
Show 6 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 749d gap
- New Hampshire State AGbd_c4e2bdaabacbbb7b2025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_c7612c4a6830f8b72025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_ca2ba043c9e6ee782025-11-07 · +708dVerified
- South Carolina State AGbd_bf81aee2cadc8d1c2025-11-10 · +711dVerified
- Texas State AGbd_ef3b14051712046e2025-11-12 · +713dVerified
- Oregon State AGbd_0cae136dc74462fa2025-12-18 · +749dVerified
Showing first 10 of 12 linked disclosures.
Filing propagation · 11 filings · 10 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Nov 30, last Dec 18 (OR) — a 749-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Cascade drawn from the first 10 linked disclosures of 12 — the full spread may be wider.
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs