Wright, Moore, DeHart, Dupuis & Hutchinson, LLC
bd_ad5c3e9784dfab56 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Wright, Moore, DeHart, Dupuis & Hutchinson, LLC →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
For years, the accounting firm of Wright, Moore, DeHart, Dupuis & Hutchinson (WMDDH) has been providing quality, personalized financial guidance to individuals and businesses. WMDDH's expertise ranges from basic tax management and accounting services to more in-depth services such as audits, financial statements, litigation support, management advisory and consulting services. WMDDH has an extensive background dealing with the oil and gas industry, and we service clients ranging from small companies to multi-national operations. WMDDH takes the approach that we are your partner in business. By combining our expertise, experience and the team mentality of our staff, we assure that every client receives the close analysis and attention they deserve. Our dedication to high standards, hiring of seasoned professionals, and work ethic has provided that level of service for our clients across the country. We take pride in building long-term relationships with our clients and are committed to providing the highest level of personalized service in the industry.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Aug 29, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
This record's own dates cannot anchor compliance clocks; see the linked filings.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (6) · sorted by filing gap
- Indiana State AGbd_9511371cc02b3ee62024-09-19 · +387dVerified by operator
- Montana State AGbd_e4c7a55302fe5c1b2024-09-19 · +387dVerified by operator
- Vermont State AGbd_770f3d75e2da00a72024-09-23 · +391dVerified
- California State AGbd_d29a7a549eca7bdd2024-09-24 · +392dVerified by operator
Show 2 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 393d gap
- Massachusetts State AGbd_e3d01385e524a45f2024-09-24 · +392dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_988f44a7da50d8472024-09-25 · +393dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 6 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Sep 19 (IN), last Sep 25 (ME) — a 6-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs