Edmonds School District
bd_a3c1da9ae24ac523 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Edmonds School District →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Edmonds School District's 35 schools cover approximately 36 square miles within the communities of Brier, Edmonds, Lynnwood, Mountlake Terrace, Woodway and portions of unincorporated Snohomish County. Edmonds School District's data covers approximately 10GB ( sql file) on our server and seems not to be very interested in saving it. So we are ready to share it with everyone interested. I think you can imagine what data will be released: personal students documents, employees info, financials, accounting and much other. We are working on the release.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jan 31, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
This record's own dates cannot anchor compliance clocks; see the linked filings.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (9) · sorted by filing gap
- Montana State AGbd_9957884c9a34dc642023-05-15 · +104dVerified by operator
- Maine State AGbd_a760a2957dc163fa2023-05-15 · +104dVerified by operator
- Massachusetts State AGbd_eadbb7a0a4019ca22023-05-15 · +104dVerified by operator
- New Hampshire State AGbd_1b4de5792e8a02632023-05-18 · +107dVerified
Show 5 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 339d gap
- Maine State AGbd_35a106fac1ea30262023-10-06 · +248dVerified by operator
- New Hampshire State AGbd_8fbc9c1b971a59932023-10-06 · +248dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_ca669b3e06ee0fb42023-10-06 · +248dVerified by operator
- Washington State AGbd_de1acf46bdc56b2c2023-10-06 · +248dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_b45d798f09fe40782024-01-05 · +339dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 9 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing May 15 (MT), last Jan 5 (ME) — a 235-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs