Paylogix
bd_9d54362b0b4d6fe9 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Paylogix →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Paylogix is an insuretech pioneer offering premium technology sol utions that streamline the administration of voluntary benefits. Their robust suite of services includes enrollment, premium billi ng, alternative funding, and a software-as-a-service platform tai lored for groups of all sizes. We will upload 185gb of corporate data soon. Employee personal in formation (complete information about 130 employees including SSN s, passports, DLs and so on), client information, detailed financ ials, internal confidential files, NDAs and so on.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jan 15, 2026
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (9) · sorted by filing gap
- Massachusetts State AGbd_1cbe760a7baf97602026-08-01 · +198dVerified by operator
- Illinois State AGbd_ac2e39236975ec002026-08-01 · +198dVerified
- New Hampshire State AGbd_14770e2c01c0cb1f2026-08-14 · +211dVerified by operator
- Washington State AGbd_1f94d81f89d6c69f2026-08-14 · +211dVerified
Show 5 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 222d gap
- Vermont State AGbd_6e73b080f999ee562026-08-14 · +211dVerified by operator
- Oregon State AGbd_9650736cc75dc07f2026-08-14 · +211dVerified
- California State AGbd_fb2ce99e0269730f2026-08-14 · +211dVerified by operator
- South Carolina State AGbd_1bffe30fdb8208af2026-08-17 · +214dVerified by operator
- Pressakirabd_ca3cbddf2cb96e962026-08-25 · +222dCandidate
Filing propagation · 10 filings · 8 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jan 15, last Aug 25 — a 222-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs