Social EngineeringHealthcareGovernmentHealthcarePhishingStolen CredentialsCustomer Data InvolvedEmployee Data InvolvedTargetedPHIHealth (basic)Identity (basic)MediumResolved

Spokane Regional Health District

bd_91cd751fa7f2af6a · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Medium

Discovered

Dec 21, 2021

Filed

Jan 19, 2022

To disclose

29 days

Affected

1,058state residents only

Confidence

70%

Full breach record for Spokane Regional Health District →2 incidents on file

Spokane Regional Health District (SRHD) notified the WA AG of a phishing incident on Jan 19, 2022. On Dec 21, 2021, an employee clicked a malicious link, compromising Office 365 credentials. The attacker accessed email and SharePoint, exposing PHI (names, DOB, case numbers, urinalysis results, medications) of 1,058 Washington residents. SRHD contained the breach by resetting passwords, disabling accounts, and enforcing MFA re-enrollment. Notification letters were sent starting Jan 14, 2022.

J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source

Washington clock✓ WA AG ≤30d29 days discovery → filing

⚠ occurrence dateThe stored discovery date equals the breach OCCURRENCE date. Detection is normally later, so this OVERSTATES the delay — a 'late' verdict here may not be real.

Incident timeline

discovery → filing · 29 days

Dec 21, 2021

Begins

Dec 21, 2021

Discovered

Jan 19, 2022

Filed

vs. sector median

7 wks faster

Tracked as a single-filing incident — the only disclosure on record for this event so far.Confirmed1,058 affectedView incident

Name: Spokane Regional Health District
norm: spokane regional health district
Domain: srhd.org
Industry: Government

Name: Spokane Regional Health District
norm: spokane regional health district
Domain: srhd.org
Industry: Government
Industry: HealthcarellmGovernmentllm

Discovered: Dec 21, 2021
Breach occurred: Dec 21, 2021
Undetected for: 0 daysoccurrence → discovery
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: Jan 14, 2022
Affected individuals: 1,058state-resident count only
Data types: PHIHealth (basic)Identity (basic)
Data elements: NameDate of birthMedical information
WA-stated cause: Cyberattack
WA-stated duration: lifecycle Unknowndexposure Unknownd
WA-stated discovery: Found while ongoingContained same day
Attack vector: Phishing
MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkT1078 Valid AccountsT1114 Email Collection
Threat actor: ExternalFinancial
Regulator citations: Notified the Washington State Attorney General’s Office
Initial access: phishing_link

During the incident: Disconnected all of the affected employees’ logins to Office 365
Reset their password
Forced a re-enrollment for multifactor authentication devices
Forced a disconnection of the VPN connection
Assisted the employee with the setup of a new password and re-enrollment of their multifactor authentication
Changes made: Working to finalize geolocation-based limitations on accessing Office 365
Planning an agency-wide cybersecurity refresher training
Implementing appropriate corrective actions to mitigate this type of unauthorized disclosure in the future
Additional technical controls and training for our staff
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 29 days(29 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: WA AG ≤30d
Discovery-date grounding: occurrence dateThe stored discovery date equals the breach OCCURRENCE date. Detection is normally later, so this OVERSTATES the delay — a 'late' verdict here may not be real.

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/databreach/BreachA5268.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Jan 19, 2022
Raw hash: 7c95ed62e75854b1338bf0e976b18f6bd888e0cac1dd8b7601d45dfe70b6e903

Reporting entitySpokane Regional Health District

Victim entitySpokane Regional Health District

Incidentdiscovered Dec 21, 2021

Stated responseDisconnected all of the affected employees’ logins to Office 365

ComplianceWA AG ≤30d

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenanceagportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com