PEÑA BRIONES MCDANIEL & CO.
bd_86ae20157535d2f4 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for PEÑA BRIONES MCDANIEL & CO. →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
PEÑA BRIONES MCDANIEL & CO. offers a wide range of accounting, ta x, assurance, and consulting services across Texas and New Mexico . Their clientele includes individuals, non-profits, governments, financial institutions, and businesses from various industries. We are ready to upload more than 34 GB of essential corporate doc uments such as: marriage licenses, corporate licenses, agreements and contracts, personal passport scans, driver licenses, contact numbers and e-mail addresses of employees and customers, financi al data (audits, payment details, reports), etc.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Apr 15, 2025
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (7) · sorted by filing gap
- Indiana State AGbd_ec7704e35e424edb2025-08-08 · +115dVerified by operator
- Massachusetts State AGbd_a118e5d1286cfabe2025-08-18 · +125dVerified by operator
- Texas State AGbd_99926532cb3762612025-08-19 · +126dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_14785cd344cbd74e2025-09-16 · +154dVerified by operator
Show 3 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 156d gap
- Indiana State AGbd_3467a3c4bfe299372025-09-16 · +154dVerified by operator
- Maine State AGbd_a214ab7508cc61692025-09-16 · +154dCandidate
- Texas State AGbd_3ab595440f3c33af2025-09-18 · +156dVerified
Filing propagation · 8 filings · 4 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Apr 15, last Sep 18 (TX) — a 156-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs