Henna Chevrolet
bd_7d63b6f4b4ce5ce9 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Henna Chevrolet →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Henna Chevrolet, part of the Henna Motor Co., has been proudly se rving Austin, Texas, motorists for more than seven decades, and w e look forward to continuing to provide our customers with the sa me unsurpassed level of care that they've come to expect from the Henna name. We are ready to upload more than 43 GB of essential corporate doc uments such as: driver licenses, financial data (audits, payment details, reports), contact numbers and e-mail addresses of employ ees and customers, personal SSN’s, etc.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Apr 4, 2025
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (3) · sorted by filing gap
- Nebraska State AGbd_6d265d897f2a35e32025-08-15 · +133dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_4622abf99b7476932025-08-17 · +135dVerified
- Texas State AGbd_3396ddfe9979e4ce2025-08-19 · +137dCandidate
Filing propagation · 4 filings · 3 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Apr 4, last Aug 19 (TX) — a 137-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs