Great Plains State Bank
bd_7cc0083ed1c871af · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Great Plains State Bank →3 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Great Plains National Bank is a full-service community bank with branches in Oklahoma and Texas, offering personal banking solutio ns designed to meet your financial needs including checking, savi ngs, loan and mortgage services. We are ready to upload more than 18 GB of internal corporate docu ments including: NDAs, driver licenses, contact numbers and e-mai l addresses of employees and customers etc.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Dec 16, 2024
Claim posted
—
Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (6) · sorted by filing gap
- Nebraska State AGbd_042c3865dc5c23772025-02-19 · +65dCandidate
- Indiana State AGbd_52460b6e57da1cf62025-02-19 · +65dVerified
- Maryland State AGbd_764fa9a67a26e3242025-02-19 · +65dVerified
- Vermont State AGbd_a1f0277f73be677e2025-02-19 · +65dVerified
Show 2 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 65d gap
- Massachusetts State AGbd_d8debe286ca17aca2025-02-19 · +65dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_dc876070b235c24f2025-02-19 · +65dVerified
Filing propagation · 7 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Dec 16, last Feb 19 (ME) — a 65-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs