PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC
bd_78ace09df5192e15 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
PennantPark is an independent middle market credit provider speci alizing in targeted exposure to core middle market credit. We are ready to upload more than 6 GB of documents such as: emplo yee documents (SSNs, IDs, passports, DLs, and so on), financial d ata, confidential reports, client data, etc.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jun 25, 2025
Claim posted
—
Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_fb499c43a3c6f83d2025-07-07 · +13dVerified
Regulatory filings (7) · sorted by filing gap
- New Hampshire State AGbd_fe7f24465ecb5e2e2025-06-27 · +2dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_426e03757de9a2fd2025-06-30 · +5dVerified
- Nebraska State AGbd_4c22865a4a57c5412025-06-30 · +5dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_69b5e85cc2e8e9bc2025-06-30 · +5dVerified
Show 3 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 100d gap
- Indiana State AGbd_9e4c8fbd232238432025-06-30 · +5dVerified
- Texas State AGbd_c34e3deec4ac408a2025-07-03 · +8dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_8225424a5a67c4ef2025-10-03 · +100dVerified
Filing propagation · 8 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jun 25, last Oct 3 (MA) — a 100-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs