Hospitality Staffing Solutions
bd_7744dd63c753aaa7 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Hospitality Staffing Solutions →2 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Hospitality Staffing Solutions is a trusted partner of industry leaders across the country. Whether you're looking for a job in the hospitality industry or need services to grow your business, the HSS team is here to help. If you're a threat actor scouring thedark web for personal documents and business secrets, HSS is ready to help as well. These guys said they don't want their 1.31 TBof data, so we're ready to share it with you. Detailed employee and customer data will be uploaded to our blog soon.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jun 29, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (7) · sorted by filing gap
- Indiana State AGbd_1c1fed049d1872cf2023-08-02 · +34dCandidate
- California State AGbd_2ea121632b46421f2023-08-07 · +39dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_472b13a1a5db8fcb2023-08-07 · +39dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_8c7a11019cf52f5e2023-08-07 · +39dVerified
Show 3 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 50d gap
- Montana State AGbd_acd106038107e8c92023-08-07 · +39dVerified
- New Hampshire State AGbd_8ad25f318974f46d2023-08-16 · +48dVerified
- South Carolina State AGbd_f37faa0d2722614c2023-08-18 · +50dVerified
Filing propagation · 8 filings · 7 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jun 29, last Aug 18 (SC) — a 50-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs