Electronic SYSTEMS SpA
bd_71bfb84aa0d9b7b4 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Electronic SYSTEMS SpA →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Electronic Systems is a world leader in the production of cycle measurement, control and automation systems. It is constantly committed to improve its know-how and competences in the automation markets and to develop more modern measurement gauges and sensors in order to face the global market with ever greater impulsion. Its leading position is the result of a combination of state-of-the-art technology with an experienced research and development team enabling the Company to offer high-quality systems – absolutely essential for the safe and efficient management of the entire production process in the rubber and plastic industry. Together with a highly-performing production plant in Momo, in the province of Novara, with a staff of 100 persons including highly-specialised engineers and technicians, Electric Systems has strategic Customer Service offices in Germany, France, Spain, China, Poland, Brazil, North and South America to provide fast and reliable on-site after-sales services. Its positioning, the never-ending effort to increase the corporate expertise and competitiveness in the automation market as well as to develop the latest gauges and sensors in order to meet the requirements of the global market and the quality-oriented corporate policy have enabled Electric Systems to become one of the few Italian companies with a prominent position on the hard quality-focused German market, to fit about 90% of the rubber plants existing in China with its measurement systems and to reach an annual turnover exceeding 18 million Euros, as well as a yearly production capability of 2500 thickness measurement gauges. The new technologies created by the R&D department has led to the registration of innovative patents for Beta sensor measurement systems and for air-sensor thickness measurement systems and the corporate quality policy has resulted in the certification of a Qualit
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Apr 4, 2023
Claim posted
—
No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
—
Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs