ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION
bd_6ec09ae80601c340 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION →3 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Academy Mortgage is a family-owned mortgage company based in Draper, Utah, which was founded in 1988. Academy is a direct lender, meaning it handles all of its underwriting and funding in house. It offers both new purchase mortgages and refinance loans, originating more than $15.65 billion in loans in 2021. Duane is the principal owner and founder of Academy Mortgage Corporation, a national mortgage banking firm with its headquarters in Draper, Utah. Duane started Academy Mortgage in 1988. Academy has over 350 branch offices across the country; and is licensed to originate loans in 49 states and the District of Columbia.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
May 14, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (10) · sorted by filing gap
- New Hampshire State AGbd_73ec5e6957b4c72d2023-12-19 · +219dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_230a4a729e72b2c72023-12-20 · +220dCandidate
- Montana State AGbd_3b5884dbff92d2bb2023-12-27 · +227dVerified
- Washington State AGbd_e304b68c35220b072023-12-27 · +227dVerified
Show 6 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 246d gap
- Oregon State AGbd_d76d3319b21c6f7b2024-01-05 · +236dVerified
- California State AGbd_e728b3b38da978092024-01-05 · +236dVerified
- South Carolina State AGbd_9e37c4b7bf5d06f12024-01-08 · +239dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_2fd5bd42961ec23c2024-01-15 · +246dVerified
- California State AGbd_7a0d1938864b9a742024-01-15 · +246dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_a04b7d44352861c22024-01-15 · +246dVerified
Filing propagation · 11 filings · 9 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing May 14, last Jan 15 (ME) — a 246-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs