Social EngineeringHealthcareFinancial ServicesHealthcarePhishingStolen CredentialsTargetedMulti-Stage ChainIdentity (basic)Health (basic)LowActive

Cigna International Corporation

bd_612ad709126a067d · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Low

Discovered

Sep 5, 2018

Filed

Oct 10, 2018

To disclose

5 weeks

Affected

6state residents only

Linked

3 filings

Confidence

66%

Full breach record for Cigna International Corporation →5 incidents on file

Cigna Corporation disclosed a credential stuffing attack targeting the myCigna customer portal. Suspicious activity was detected on September 5, 2018, with unauthorized access continuing until September 24, 2018. Attackers used stolen credentials from other breaches to access accounts, potentially viewing names, contact info, and medical history. Cigna disabled accounts, engaged forensic investigators, and implemented MFA and IP blocking.

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Incident timeline

discovery → filing · 5 weeks / 35 days

Sep 5, 2018

Begins

Sep 5, 2018

Discovered

Oct 10, 2018

Filed

vs. sector median

7 wks faster

This filing is one of 3 about the same incident.View merged incident

Linked disclosures

Why this link?

Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap

HHS OCRbd_03b11a85be97a5192018-10-10Verified
Oregon State AGbd_6a96bd75470b3b2d2018-10-10Verified

Name: Cigna International Corporation
norm: cigna international
Domain: cigna.com

Name: Cigna International Corporation
norm: cigna international
Domain: cigna.com
Industry: HealthcarellmFinancial Servicesllm

Discovered: Sep 5, 2018
Breach occurred: Sep 5, 2018 – Sep 24, 2018
Undetected for: 0 daysoccurrence → discovery
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: —
Affected individuals: 6state-resident count only
Data types: Identity (basic)Health (basic)
Attack vector: Phishing
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 Valid AccountsT1566.002 Spearphishing Link
Threat actor: ExternalFinancial
Initial access: valid_credentials

During the incident: Disabled affected accounts
Blocked the sources of the attack
Increased myCigna security
Put into place protections such as location-based Internet Protocol (IP) blocking
Implementing additional measures such as a login prompt known as captcha and two-step authentication
Engaged a nationally known third-party cyber-security firm to verify we’ve taken the proper steps to investigate what happened and continue to mitigate future attacks
Changes made: Implementing additional measures such as a login prompt known as captcha and two-step authentication
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 5 weeks(35 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: — (clock not assessable for this source)

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Filing propagation · 3 filings · 3 states

View merged incident ↗

HHS OCROct 10 · first

Oregon State AGOct 10 · first

Montana State AGOct 10 · first · this page

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/Cigna.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Oct 10, 2018
Raw hash: 335de8d25de950bdbddd4b52528ad32a0f2e1e27712e30ac1e7fcf16e411b8cf

Linked disclosures

Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap

Reporting entityCigna International Corporation

Victim entityCigna International Corporation

Incidentdiscovered Sep 5, 2018

Stated responseDisabled affected accounts

Complianceclock not assessable

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenancedojmt.gov